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INFORMATION IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO
IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MONrORD ARTHuR ORLoF
The statutory information in the nature of quo warranto' is a
remedy granted by the appropriate provisions of the Washington Con-
stitution2 and statutes.3 Except for very minor changes,4 the statutory
provisions have remained unaltered since first enacted as laws of the-
Territory in 1854. The decisions dealing with sections of the earlier
laws are therefore, still of full effect except in so far as they have been
distinguished or qualified by later decisions involving the same issues.
The modem statutory information is an outgrowth of the old com-
mon law writ of quo warranto.5 The common law writ, as distinguished
from the common law information in the nature of quo warranto, had
long been used by the crown to test the right of a person or a corpora-
tion to the possession of, or title to, public office, franchise, or charter
emanating from the crown.' The writ of quo warranto was a high pre-
rogative writ in the nature of a writ of right for the crown.7 But the
writ in its early form was not a satisfactory remedy. The procedure
was cumbersome; also, there was an additional disadvantage in that
judgment once rendered thereon was final even as against the crown.
Therefore, it was early displaced to a great extent by a common law in-
formation in the nature of quo warranto which did away with a
greater part of the procedural defects of the common law writ, as well
as, mitigating the finality of judgment rule. Moreover, the common law
information was criminal in nature, a quality not possessed by the
common law writ. However, this latter quality has not been carried
over into the American practice, the information at present being al-
most entirely civil in nature.8
'The word "information" will hereinafter be used to denote the lengthier
title "information in the nature of quo warranto."
'WAsM CONST. art. IV, § 4 provides: "The supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus
as to all state officers ..."
WAsH. CoNsT. art. IV, § 6 provides: "Said courts and their judges shall
have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari,
prohibition and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of
any person in actual custody in their respective counties."
REv .REv. STAT. § 1034-1048.
'REmI. REV. STAT. § 1034(3) was enacted in Wash. Laws 1877, c. 57.
§ 706(3). Also, "superior court" has replaced "district court"; and the
word "state" has replaced the word "Territory" since the appearance of
the statute in Wash. Code 1881, c. 61, H8 702-716.
5FERlis, THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1926) § 101; HIGH,
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REmEDIES (3rd ed. 1896) §§ 592-599; 2 SPELLING,
INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (2d ed. 1901) § 1767.
FERus, op. cit. supra note 5, § 101; HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 592.
HIGH, loc. cit. supra note 6.
SMills v. State ex Tel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891); FERuS,
op. cit. supra note 5, 8H 103, 107; HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, 88 599, 600;
2 SPELLING, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1768.
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In their early forms, neither the common law writ of quo warranto,
nor the common law information were used as a means of trying title
to public office in litigation between two claimants thereto. But this
defect was remedied by the Statute of Anne9 which allowed the com-
mon law information to be used for this purpose. It is to be noted that
this statute made it possible for a private person to file the informa-
tion on his own relation, though in the name of the crown. 10 It is to
the common law information as amended by the Statute of Anne that
the Washington statute relating to this remedy is traceable."
In view of the distinction between the common law writ of quo war-
ranto and the later information under the Statute of Anne, is it of im-
portance that the Washington Constitution mentions specifically only
the writ of quo warranto?12 When confronted with similar constitu-
tional provisions, courts of other jurisdictions have had some diffi-
culty, the issue being whether the courts had power under the consti-
tutional provision only to issue the more narrow common law writ of
quo warranto, or whether by construction, they might issue the infor-
mation as well.1 3 The better view appears to be that the intention was
to give the courts the power to issue the information as well as the
common law writ.14 So far as the cases show, this question has never
been argued before the Washington Supreme Court. However, in view
of the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions, as well as the long con-
tinued practice of the Washington courts in entertaining such infor-
mations, the question appears to be rhetorical. Assuming that the
courts have the right to entertain actions on the information, may they
do likewise as to the common law writ? There is some authority point-
ing to the conclusion that the court has the power to issue the common
law writ as well as the information. Thus in the case of State ex rel.
Clausen v. Hartley,5 the court entertained an original writ of quo war-
ranto on the relation of a private person to try title to an alleged State
office, that of chairman of the State Highway Commission. The court
dismissed the action on the ground that the position in contest was not
an "office" within the meaning of the constitutional provision giving the
supreme court jurisdiction to issue an original writ of quo warranto."
This decision raises an interesting question: If the court considered
'9 Anne. c. 20 (1710); for context see HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, Ap-
pendix A.
"Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891); FEmS,
op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 103, 107.
1" Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891).
"See note 2, supra.
"HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 610-614; 2 SPELLING, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 1710.
"ibid.
'144 Wash. 135, 257 Pac. 396 (1927).
"See note 2, supra.
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this to be a writ of quo warranto as contrasted with an information,
such writ could not be brought on the relation of a private person under
the common law practice.'7 Thus, the court had an additional ground
not mentioned in the opinion for dismissing the writ. The more prob-
able view appears to be that in using the words "writ of quo warranto"
the court was referring to the information under the statute. Under
the statutory remedy, as will be illustrated later, the information may
be brought by a private relator in certain circumstances; therefore, the
court correctly made no mention of the point. Support for the con-
tention that the writ of quo warranto is not available in Washington
is given by several decisions which unequivocally assert that the sta-
tutory information supplants entirely the common law practice.' s Under
this view, which later decisions have not questioned, the remedy is only
available where the statutory conditions are substantially complied
with, notwithstanding the fact that relief might have been given in a
similar situation under the common law information or writ.19
I
PROCEDURAL ANALYSLS OF THE STATUTORY INFORMATION
As has been noted, the jurisdiction of the supreme court and of
the superior court in matters involving the issuance of writs of quo
warranto is granted by the Washington Constitution. Since the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the supreme court is limited to those cases involv-
ing state officers,20 it is the jurisdiction of the superior court that is of
greater practical importance. The jurisdiction of the superior court is
not limited expressly as is the jurisdiction of the supreme court."' The
few decisions that have raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the su-
perior court are concerned with the possibility of depriving the court
of that jurisdiction by statutes vesting the right to try title to public
office in another officer or tribunal..2 - Thus where the statute gave the
"See Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 574, 27 Pac. 560, 562 (1891).
"Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 571, 27 Pac. 560, 561 (1891):
"The common law on that subject has been supplanted by the statute-
the state has legislated on the subject-and it is to the statute we must
look, not only for the practice of the court, but for the qualifications of
the relator." See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28
Wash. 488, 492, 68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902).
"State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68
Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902), wherein the court denied the right of the
attorney general to file the information on the ground that he did not
qualify as a relator under Section 1035, notwithstanding the fact that at
common law the attorney general was the accepted relator on such an
information. Accord: State ex rel. Hamilton v. Superior Court, 103 Wash.
Dec. 558, 101 P. (2d) 588 (1940).
"State ex rel. Clausen v. Hartley, 144 Wash. 135, 257 Pac. 396 (1927);
see note 2, supra.
"See note 2, supra.
"State ex rel. Heilborn v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894);
State ex rel. Blake v. Morris, 14 Wash. 262, 44 Pac. 266 (1896); State ex rel.
Niggle v. Kirkwood, 15 Wash. 298, 46 Pac. 331 (1896); State ex rel. Hyland
v. Peter, 21 Wash. 243, 57 Pac. 814 (1899).
1940]
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city council of a city the right to settle election disputes, the issue raised
was the right to settle such a dispute by means of an information filed
by one of the contestants. The respondent pleaded that the city coun-
cil had sole jurisdiction under the statute. The court held the plea to
have been rightfully overruled by the lower court, citing the following
constitutional provision:
"The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all
cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not
have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; . .""
The court then decided that the relator had resorted to the proper rem-
edy.24 Under the principal case and related decisions, the jurisdiction
of the superior court would appear to be at least coordinate with that
of any other tribunal authorized by statute to try matters within the
scope of the statutory information.
The statutory provisions regulating the persons who shall be proper
parties to the information are contained in Sections 1034 and 1035.
The former section deals with parties respondent, a matter to be dealt
with in some detail later. It is with the latter section that we are im-
mediately concerned. This section specifies those persons who may
properly act as relators on an information. It reads:
"The information may be filed by the prosecuting attorney in
the superior court of the proper county, upon his own relation,
whenever he shall deem it his duty to do so, or shall be di-
rected by the court or other competent authority, or by any
other person on his own relation, whenever he claims an in-
terest in the office, franchise, or corporation which is the sub-
ject of the information."2
It will be noted that the prosecuting attorney is only given authority
to file the information in the superior court of the proper county, the
statute omitting mention of his possible authority to file the informa-
tion in the supreme court in cases wherein that court has original jur-
isdiction. No case has been discovered in which the court has dealt
with this question, but in view of the explicit wording of the statute,
and in light of the court's decision in State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Seattle Gas Co.,2 6 it might have some difficulty in finding statutory au-
thority for such an action by a prosecuting attorney. In that case as has
been noted, the court held that the attorney general in his official ca-
pacity had no standing as a relator under the statutory provision set
forth above, deciding that he had no "interest" in the statutory sense.
The case controlled a recent decision.'.
The prosecuting attorney need not show any "interest" other than
'WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
2'State ex rel. Blake v. Morris, 14 Wash. 262, 44 Pac. 266 (1896).
"IREM. REV. STAT. § 1035.
"28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902).




that the cause upon which the action by information is based is con-
cerned with the public weal. As stated by the court:
"The legislature has looked out for the interests of the pub-
lic by providing that the information shall be filed by the
prosecuting attorney, either on his own relation, or when di-
rected by the court or other competent authority; ... ,17
However, difficulty has been caused by the excerpt from the statu-
tory provisions which reads: " . . . by the prosecuting attorney .. .
whenever he shall deem it his duty to do so, or shall be directed by
the court or other competent authority ...." The issue is whether the
ultimate discretion to issue the information is vested in the prosecuting
attorney or in the superior court. The decisions upon this question have
left little room for further clarification. The rule seems to be that the
prosecuting attorney may be ordered by the superior court to file an
information when the court in the exercise of its sound discretion feels
the circumstances so justify. 8 Nor is the decision of the court sub-
ject to review unless it plainly appears that the court has abused its
discretion.29 In order to bring before the court the circumstances al-
legedly justifying the issuance of the information, the usual practice is
for a private person to petition the court to order the prosecuting at-
torney to file an information, the petition alleging the circumstances
upon which the information is to be based. If the prosecuting attorney
demurs to the petition, and in the event his demurrer is overruled, the
court will not order him to file an information immediately, but will
allow him sufficient time in which to investigate the circumstances in
order that he may file a proper answer if he wishes to do so. If an
answer is filed, the court will from the facts determined reach its judg-
ment as to whether the information should be filed or not.30 In the
event it should decide in the affirmative, or if no answer is filed after
the demurrer is overruled, an order is directed to the prosecuting at-
torney specifying that he file an information for cause alleged; if the
court decides in the negative, the petition is, of course, dismissed. In
either event the final order may be reviewed by the supreme court for
error alleged.31
'Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 572, 27 Pac. 560 (1891).
"State ex rel. Cummings v. Blackwell, 91 Wash. 81, 157 Pac. 223 (1916);
State ex rel. Gilbert v. Prosecuting Attorney, 92 Wash. 484, 159 Pac. 761(1916); State ex rel. State Humane Society v. Hovey, 159 Wash. 584, 294
Pac. 258 (1930); cf. State ex rel. White v. Point Roberts Reef Fish Co., 42,
Wash. 409, 85 Pac. 22 (1906).21State ex rel. State Humane Society v. Hovey, 159 Wash. 584, 294 Pac.
258 (1930).
"See cases cited supra note 28.
'But the petitioner may not appeal from the interlocutory order direct-
ing the prosecuting attorney to investigate the circumstances, since by its
very nature, such an order is not a final one subject to review by an im-




Moreover, the prosecuting attorney may be directed to file an in-
formation by "other competent authority". Thus, in one case, the
board of county commissioners directed the prosecuting attorney of
the county to file an information in order to oust one of their number
from office for cause shown. 2 And no doubt in an appropriate case,
the city council or other authority might direct the prosecuting attor-
ney to institute an action of this nature.
Section 1035 of the statute also provides for the filing of an infor-
mation in the name of the state upon the relation of a private party.
".. .whenever he claims an interest in the office, fran-
chise or corporation which is the subject of the information."
In this provision, it is the word "interest" around which litigation has
centered. In the initial decision involving the statute, the issue was
whether the mayor of a city had a sufficient "interest" in the office of
a city councilman to give him standing as a relator on an information
filed to try title to said office. The court held he had not, even though
the office was to be filled by an appointee designated by the mayor,
with the approval of the city council.3 3 In discussing this question the
court said:
"What interest is meant? Surely not an interest in common
with other citizens, for the protection of that interest is al-
ready provided for in the first part of the section (1035).'
If the statute is to be construed as having any meaning at all,
and if words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and the
ordinary grammatical construction is to be given to the lan-
guage and sentences, it must mean that the interest must be a
special interest, not common with the interests of the com-
munity.
35
Similarly, it has been held that the mayor-elect for a full term had
not sufficient interest in the preceding term of a former mayor who
had been recalled to act as relator in an information brought against
the temporary mayor chosen by the city council to fill the remaining
portion of the term. The fact that the relator had been elected for the
future term gave him no right to claim the unexpired portion of the
present term." It has also been held that a taxpayer and citizen has
not sufficient interest without more to qualify as a relator in an infor-
mation filed against a commissioner of a public utility district.17
However, a bona fide claim to office would appear to give the rela-
tor sufficient standing to come within the statutory requirement of in-
"'State ex rel. Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327, 60 P. (2d) 245 (1936).
" Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891).
'Section number inserted.
"5Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891); Manlove
v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P. (2d) 397 (1939).
"State ex rel. Dore v. Superior Court, 167 Wash. 655, 9 P. (2d) 1087
(1932).
"Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P. (2d) 397 (1939).
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terest; and an information asserting such right in the relator would not
be open to demurrer on this point.
Turning from the cases involving public offices to those concerned
with title to office in a private corporation, it has been held that a
stockholder in a private corporation has sufficient interest under the
statute to qualify as a relator in an information filed to oust trustees
of the corporation allegedly holding office without right.39 Likewise,
in a proceeding to oust a corporation for alleged non-user of its fran-
chise, it has been held that a shareholder may act as relator on the in-
formation. °
However, where a businessman alleged that a competing corporation
had forfeited its franchise for mis-user, the court on motion of the re-
spondent dismissed the information on the ground that the relator had
not sufficient interest to file the information on his own relation.41 Whe-
ther a creditor, as contrasted with a shareholder or business cbmpeti-
tor, in an appropriate case would have sufficient interest to sustain the
filing of an information on his own relation, naming a corporation as
respondent, has not been decided by the court. It is arguable that a
creditor's interest is greater than that of the ordinary member of the
community, so that under the test laid down by the court, he might
qualify as a relator.
Finally, as has been noted above, the attorney general by nature of
his office alone has not sufficient interest per se to qualify as a relator
without special statutory sanction. 42 This case appears to be contrary to
the former common law practice, as well as to the present practice in
many jurisdictions.4 3 Under the wording of Section 1035 of the sta-
tute the court might easily have held that the attorney general had
sufficient interest without more to act as relator on, an information
O'State ex rel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894);
State ex rel. Tremblay v. McQuade, 12 Wash- 554, 41 Pac. 897 (1895); State
ex rel. Niggle v. Kirkwood, 15 Wash. 298, 46 Pac. 331 (1896); State ex rel.
Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958 (1897); State ex rel. Orr v.
Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49 Pac. 346 (1897); State ex rel. Hyland v. Peter,
21 Wash. 243, 57 Pac. 814 (1899); State ecx rel. Holt v. Hamilton, 118 Wash.
91, 202 Pac. 971 (1921). See also State ex rel. Dent v. McLennan, 110 Wash.
16, 187 Pac. 408 (1920); State ex Tel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 164 Wash. 211,
2 P. (2d) 725 (1931).
-State ex rel. Mitchell v. Horan, 22 Wash. 197, 60 Pac. 135 (1900).
'
0State ex rel. Conlan v. Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Co., 48 Wash. 196,
93 Pac. 219 (1908).
"
1State ex rel. White v. Point Roberts Reef Fish Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85
Pac. 22 (1906).
'
2State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac.
946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902).
"Attorney General ecx rel. Mann v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 129 N.E.
662 (1921); State ex inf. McAllister ex rel. Manion v. Albany Drainage
Dist., 290 Mo. 33, 234 S.W. 339 (1921); Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v.
American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 290 Pa. 136, 138 Ati. 497 (1927);
see HIGH op. cit. supra note 5, § 697.
19401
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filed for the purpose of preventing usurpation of a public franchise.
However, the court recently held that REM. REV. STAT. § 316 authoriz-
ing prosecuting attorneys to represent the state subject to the "super-
visory control and direction of the attorney general" does not permit the
attorney general to seek a writ of prohibition against a prosecuting at-
torney who has instituted quo warranto proceedings.'"
The few cases that have specifically addressed themselves to the na-
ture of the pleadings of an information do not seem to be in agree-
ment. The statute itself is succinct on this point:
"The information shall consist of a plain statement of the
facts which constitute the grounds of the proceedings, ad-
dressed to the court.
44
This section would appear to define the nature of the pleadings as civil
rather than criminal in form. An early case interpreting this section
adopted this view, the court stating:
"The information is, under the code, a plain statement of
the facts . . ., and therein is just like a complaint upon
any other cause of action; that it is to be filed upon the rela-
tion of someone is the only even formal difference between the
proceeding and an ordinary civil action. '
However, the court in a case decided only a few months later ap-
peared to adopt a contrary view, saying:
"These actions are in the nature of criminal actions. A
penalty is imposed, viz., the loss of the office; and when of-
ficers are called to defend an action which involves the loss of
their office for alleged malfeasance in the performance of
their official duties, law and common justice require that the
facts shall be stated as definitely as they are stated in an in-
dictment or information in a criminal action. 41 6
Finally, in a case decided several years later, the court cited with ap-
proval the opinion in the earlier case quoted above, making no mention
of the seemingly contradictory statement contained in the intermediate
case." In view of this later decision it would appear that the pleadings
are governed by the ordinary rules having to do with civil actions.
The final topic to be discussed under the procedural analysis of the
statutory information concerns certain peculiarities of trial procedure;
namely, the right to trial by jury, and the question of allocation of the
burden of proof.
The cases uniformly hold that in an action on an information, the
right to trial by jury is not guaranteed by the state constitution. The
"'State ex rel. Hamilton v. Superior Court, 103 Wash. Dec. 558, 101 P.
(2d) 588 (1940).
"REmV REV. STAT. § 1036.
State ex rel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 558, 36 Pac. 495
(1894).
'EItate ex rel. Whitney v. Friars, 10 Wash. 348, 353, 39 Pac. 104 (1894).
"State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 504,
68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902).
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rationale of this rule relates back to the practice in effect at the time
the constitution was adopted; at that time, under the statutes in force
in the Territory, trial by jury was not a matter of right in an action
brought by an information in the nature of quo warranto.4 The deci-
sions on this point seem in accord with the authorities in other juris-
dictions.4 9
The question of allocation of the burden of proof has not been so
thoroughly discussed by the court as has that of the right to trial by
jury. In State ex re. Dore v. Superior Court,4'° the court stated that in
the event the information was filed by the prosecuting attorney on his
own relation to test the right of respondent to public office, the burden
of proof is on the respondent to show his title to the office, but if the
information is filed by a private person as relator to contest the right
of respondent to public office, then the burden is upon the relator to
show his right to said office. This distinction appears to be a sound
one in those cases where the private relator is himself a claimant of the
office, even though in both cases the same public interest is being
served; viz., the removal from public office of a person not legally en-
titled thereto. However, if the private relator is not claiming the of-
fice for himself there appears to be no reason to distinguish the case
from that where the prosecuting attorney acts as relator, and the bur-
den of proof should once more be placed upon the respondent.5 1 More-
over, in cases where the information is filed by a private relator to try
title to office of a private corporation, or to obtain judgment of com-
plete or partial ouster against a private corporation, it would seem that
the absence of "public interest" would justify placing the burden of
proof upon the relator, rather than upon the respondent. 2 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court has not, as yet, dealt with this question.
II
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY INFORMATION
The question of the nature of the remedy has received some atten-
tion in the treatment of the pleadings.' The opinion there expressed
that the information was essentially civil in nature receives further sup-
port from several decisions, not there cited, which have dealt with this
"State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958 (1897); State
ex Tel. Orr v. Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49 Pac. 346 (1897).
"SPELLING, Op. cit. supra note 5, § 1875.
"167 Wash. 655, 9 P. (2d) 1087 (1932).
' Whitten v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 653, 264 Pac. 871 (1928); State ex rel.
Keller v. Wheatley, 160 Ind. 183, 66 N.E. 684 (1903); State ex rel. Blessing
v. Davis, 64 Neb. 499, 90 N.W. 232 (1902); Manahan v. Watts, 64 N. J. L. 465,
45 Atl. 813 (1900); People ex rel. Watkins v. Perley, 80 N. Y. 624 (1880);
Klick v. Snavely, 119 Ohio 308, 164 N. E. 233 (1928).
"
1See Manahan v. Watts, 64 N. J. L. 465, 469, 45 At]. 813 (1900).
"
'State ex rel. Brun v. Oftedal, 72 Minn. 498, 75 N. W. 692 (1898); HIGH,
op. cit. supra note 5 § 652.
"See p. 165 et seq., supra.
1940]
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question. Thus it has been held that an action instituted by an infor-
mation in the nature of quo warranto is not a bar to further proceed-
ings criminal in nature based upon facts disclosed in the civil action. 4
In conformity with this view, the court later held that the attorney
general, bringing the action under statutory sanction, was not entitled
to a bench warrant as a means of compelling the attendance of wit-
nesses at a trial on an information filed to oust a corporation of its
franchise for alleged mis-user, the court once more stating that the ac-
tion was civil rather than criminal in nature.5 This view is reinforced
by the court's statement that the burden of proof is on the respondent
where the state brings the information on the relation of a prosecuting
attorney, since if the action were criminal in nature the burden of proof
would be on the state."
Before considering the various grounds upon which an information
may be based, the question of the discretion of the court to issue the
information must be discussed. As has been noted, an early case held
that the common law discretion of the court to issue the information
had been entirely supplanted by the statute.17 However, under the sta-
tute the ultimate discretion to order the prosecuting attorney to file
the information remains in the court in those cases where the prosecut-
ing attorney refuses to act on cause shown. 8 But it should be noted
that if the prosecuting attorney brings an information on his own rela-
tion, the court has no discretion in the matter. The discretion of the
court appears to be limited to those cases in which the prosecuting at-
torney either refuses or neglects to file an information upon cause
shown.
Section 1034 of the statute" serves a twofold purpose, specifying
the various respondents against whom the information may be filed as
"State ex rel. Dunbar v. American University, 140 Wash. 625, 250 Pac.
52 (1926).
'State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co., 190 Wash. 496, 68 P. (2d)
1031 (1937).
"State ex rel. Dore v. Superior Court, 167 Wash. 655, 9 P. (2d) 1087(1932).
"Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891).
"See cases cited supra note 28.
"REm. REV. STAT. § 1034 provides: "An information may be filed against
any person or corporation in the following cases: (1) When any person
shall usurp, intrude upon (into), or unlawfully hold or exercise any public
office or franchise within the state, or any office in any corporation created
by authority of the state; (2) When any public officer shall have done or
suffered any act which, by the provisions of law, shall work a forfeiture of
his office; (3) When several persons claim to be entitled to the same office
or franchise, one information may be filed against any or all such persons
in order to try their respective rights to the office or franchise; (4) When
any association or number of persons shall act within this state as a
corporation without being legally incorporated; (5) Or where any corpora-
tion do [does] or omit [omits] acts which amount to a surrender or a for-
feiture of their [its] rights and privileges as a corporation, or where they[it] exercise [exercises] powers not conferred by law."
[VOL.15
well as stating the several grounds upon which it may be based 0°
The principal use of the information is to try the right to public or
private office. As to the former category, the cases are in agreement
that the information is the proper remedy to resort to in order to place
before the court the question of title to public office.61 Likewise, the
information is the proper remedy where title to private office is in
dispute." There is some indication that this is the only remedy that
may be used to decide such a question.6"
There has been no decision in which the franchise or charter of a
municipal corporation has been declared forfeited in a proceedings in-
stituted by way of an information. However, in a proper case there ap-
pears to be little doubt but that a judgment of complete or partial
ouster against a municipal corporation could be obtained by means of
such an information.6"
The information has been used more frequently in cases involving pri-
vate corporations. It is a means of enforcing forfeiture of the corpo-
ration franchise or charter for alleged non-user or mis-user thereof, or
for indulging in acts in excess of its corporate powers.65 It is important
"It is to be noted that the word "person" in Section 1034(1) has been
construed to refer to corporations as well as to natural persons. State
ex Tel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 493, 68 Pac.
946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902).
a'State ex Tel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894)
(information by member of board of public works to oust successor alleg-
edly in office without right); State ex Tel. Tremblay v. McQuade, 12 Wash.
554, 41 Pac. 897 (1895) (information by town marshal to oust incumbent);
State ex rel. Niggle v. Kirkwood, 15 Wash. 298, 46 Pac. 331 (1896) (infor-
mation by police commissioner to oust his successor allegedly appointed
without right); State ex tel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958
(1897) (information by commissioner of public works to oust successor);
State ex tel. Orr v. Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49 Pac. 346 (1897) (information
by candidate for office of mayor naming his rival as respondent); State
ex Tel. Hyland v. Peter, 21 Wash. 243, 57 Pac. 814 (1899) (information by
candidate for office of city attorney naming his rival as respondent); State
ex tel. Powell v. Fassett, 69 Wash. 555, 125 Pac. 963 (1912) (information
by construction foreman, under civil service, naming his successor as
respondent); State ex tel. Tennant v. Tollefson, 104 Wash. Dec. 197, 103
P. (2d) 36 (1940) (exclusive); see cases cited infra note 73, for authori-
ties refusing to allow the use of mandamus to determine title to office.
"Etate ex Tel. Mitchell v. Horan, 22 Wash. 197, 60 Pac. 135 (1900) -(in-
formation by shareholder of a corporation, naming trustee as respondent);
State ex Tel. Lidral v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 610, 89 P. (2d) 501 (1939)
(affirming use of information by alleged stockholder to oust directors of
a private corporation).
"Standard Gold Mining Co. v. Byers, 31 Wash. 100, 103, 71 Pac. 766
(1903), holding that a mandatory injunction could not be used as a remedy
to try title to office of private corporation; see cases cited infra note 73.
"State ex Tel. Prosecuting Attorney v. South Park, 34 Wash. 162, 75 Pac.
636 (1904); see State ex Tel. Cummings v. Blackwell, 91 Wash. 81, 157 Pac.
223 (1916); and cases cited infra note 70.
,$State ex Tel. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor v. Superior Court, 15
Wash. 668, 47 Pac. 31 (1896); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas
Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114 (1902);( State ex Tel. White v.
Point Roberts Reef Fish Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85 Pac. 22 (1906); State ex Tel.
Conlan v. Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Co., 48 Wash. 196, 93 Pac. 219 (1908);
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to note that the question of forfeiture of a corporate franchise or char-
ter may only be raised in a proceeding by information to try this spe-
cific issue. An attempt to raise this issue collaterally will not be tol-
erated by the court in light of existing decisions."° The relator in such a
proceeding may be either the prosecuting attorney, the attorney gen-
eral under statutory sanction, or a private person having the proper
qualifications. 67
The ordinary defenses pleaded in a proceeding by way of an in-
formation are defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant, availability of
other remedy, and possibly, those of the Statute of Limitations and
laches.
The plea of defect of party plaintiff is the most common defense.
This is usually raised under Section 1035 of the statute, the plea alleg-
ing that the relator has not sufficient interest to qualify as such.6"
In only one case has the plea of defect of party defendant been suc-
cessfully urged by the respondent.6 9 Here an information was filed to
forfeit the charter of a municipal corporation for alleged failure to com-
ply with the laws governing incorporation. The information named the
municipal corporation as respondent. The court affirmed the dismis-
sal of the action on the ground that the municipal corporation could not
properly be named as respondent in such a proceeding. The court said:
State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corporation, 105 Wash. 12,
177 Pac. 694 (1919); State ex ret. Dunbar v. American University, 140 Wash.
625, 250 Pac. 52 (1926); State ex rel. State Humane Society v. Hovey, 159
Wash. 584, 294 Pac. 258 (1930); Refsnes v. Myers, 164 Wash. 205, 2 P. (2d)
656 (1931); Sheffield Co. v. Hoe & Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933);
State ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P. (2d) 812
(1936). Of interest, perhaps, is State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective
Corporation, supra, wherein the court held that a corporation could not
under the guise of carrying on a legitimate business engage in the practice
of law.
'Refsnes v. Myers, 164 Wash. 205, 2 P. (2d) 656 (1931); Sheffield Co. v.
Hoe & Co., 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d) 876 (1933).
"See cases cited supra note 65.
"Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891) (holding,
the mayor of a city was not the proper person to act as relator on an
information to try title to the office of city councilman); State ex rel.
Mitchell v. Horan, 22 Wash. 197, 60 Pac. 135 (1900) (holding, a stockholder
was qualified as a relator to try title to a corporate office); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114
(1902) (holding, the attorney general was not qualified as a relator on an
information to try right of a corporation to retain a franchise); State ex
rel. White v. Point Roberts Reef Fish Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85 Pac. 22 (1906)
(holding, a business competitor was not qualified as a relator in an in-
formation filed to oust a corporation of its franchise); State ex ret. Dore v.
Superior Court, 167 Wash. 655, 9 P. (2d) 1087 (1932) (holding, a mayor
elect was not qualified as a relator in an information to try title to the
unexpired portion of the term of an ousted mayor); Manlove v. Johnson,
198 Wash. 280, 88 P. (2d) 397 (1939) (holding,'a taxpayer and citizen was
not a proper relator on an information to try title to the office of a com-
missioner of a public utility district, said relator not having shown suffi-
cient "interest").




"An information cannot be directed against a corporation
which it charges does not exist. In such case there is no entity
in existence upon which service can be made, or which can
plead to the information. It is illogical to sue an alleged ar-
tificial person for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication
that there is no such person. If there is not a corporation it
cannot be sued."
Although, the court seemed to feel that logic dictated the result
reached in the case, as a matter of practice, the decision appears to be
open to criticism.7 0 As the case itself illustrates, no actual difficulty in
service or in pleading was present; in fact, the pleading was so effi-
cacious as to cause the court to dismiss the proceedings entirely. It
would appear that actually the same parties would defend if the cor-
poration were named as respondent as where the ushrping parties
themselves were named as respondents. There appears to be no case in-
volving this point in the law of private corporations, so perhaps the
court will limit the application of the principal case to questions in-
volving only municipal corporations.
Availability of another remedy as a defense has been resorted to al-
most exclusively in cases wherein title to public office has been in dis-
pute. Thus there is a distinct line of authority holding that in a situ-
ation where title to public office may be tried under statute by an
executive officer or tribunal other than the superior or supreme courts,
this form of procedure is at most ancillary to settlement of such con-
test by means of an action by information. 7 1 And in a recent case, the
supeme court held that title of public office could not be decided in a
proceeding to enjoin certain commissioners of a public utility district,
the proper remedy being by an information.72 A related group of cases
clearly states that an information rather than mandamus is the proper
remedy to try title to public office.7 3 In one of the few cases involving
title to an office of a private corporation, the court held that title to
such office could not be tried in an action of replevin to obtain pos-
session of certain official documents, the right to possession of which
"Cf. Attorney General ex rel. Mann v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 129 N. E.662 (1921); Nelson v. Consolidated Independent School Dist. of Troy Mills,
181 Iowa 424, 164 N. W. 874 (1917); see People ex tel. Douglas v. Powell,
274 Ill. 222, 227, 113 N. E. 614 (1916): Similar cases wherein the court
allowed an information to be filed naming a municipality as respondent.
'See cases cited supra note 22.
"Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P. (2d) 397 (1939).
13Lynde v. Dibble, 19 Wash. 328, 53 Pac. 370 (1898); Kimball v. Olmsted,
20 Wash. 629, 56 Pac. 377 (1899); State ex rel. Dent v. McLennan, 110 Wash.
16, 187 Pac. 408 (1920); State ex rel Forstell v. Otis, 131 Wash. 455, 230 Pac.
414 (1924) (adversely criticized in Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 693); State
ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 164 Wash. 211, 2 P. (2d) 725 (1931); Clarken
v. Blomstrom, 174 Wash. 612, 26 P. (2d) 87 (1933); see Smith v. Baughman,
194 Wash. 78, 81, 76 P. (2d) 1022 (1938).
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followed title to the office, but that the proper remedy was by in-
formation.7"
In no case involving an action by information has the defense of
either the Statute of Limitations or of laches been pleaded. Concern-
ing the former, the Washington statute"5 appears to make a distinc-
tion between the running of the statute in cases involving a private re-
lator, and in actions brought solely for the benefit of the state. The
running of the statute is a defense only in the former case, actions for
the benefit of the state being specifically excepted from the statutory
bar. This distinction has been made by other authorities as well."
No decision in the state has considered the defense of laches. However,
it would appear that in a proper case, laches might well be pleaded as
a defense even as against the state.
A special Statute of Limitations is provided in Section 1042 of the
statute governing the information. This provides for a one-year period
within which a relator must assert his claim for damages if he has
failed to do so in an action by information."
Assuming that the relator, either the prosecuting attorney, the attor-
ney general under statutory sanction, or a private person has success-
fully prosecuted the action to the stage of final judgment. Sections 1040
and 1043 contain the statutory definition of the relief available by judg-
ment against the respondent.79
Of importance is the effect of judgment of ouster in cases involving
title to public office. In several decisions concerned with this phase of
the statutory remedy the court has uniformly held that such judgment
"Standard Gold Mining Co. v. Byers, 31 Wash. 100, 71 Pac. 766 (1903).
'6REm. REv. STAT. § 167.
"HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 621.
"Attorney General ex rel. Mann v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 129 N. E.
662 (1921); Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Union Traction Co. of
Philadelphia, 327 Pa. 497, 194 Atl. 661 (1937), (1938) 51 H.Av. L. REV. 555;
HIGH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 621; see Comment (1921) 35 HAV. L. REV. 73.
'"REM. REV. STAT. § 1042 provides: "When judgment is rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, he may, if he has not claimed his damages in the informa-
tion, have his action for the damages at any time within one year after
the judgment."
"'REM. REV. STAT. § 1040 provides: "If judgment be rendered in favor
of the relator, he shall proceed to exercise the functions of the office, after
he has been qualified as required by law, and the court shall order the
defendant to deliver over all books and papers in his custody or within his
power, belong[ing] to the office from which he has been ousted."
REM. REV. STAT. § 1043 provides that when any defendant is found
guilty of usurping any office or when a public officer shall have done
any act which works a forfeiture of his office or when any persons have
acted as a corporation without having been legally incorporated, "the
court shall give judgment of ouster against the defendant or defendants,
and exclude him or them from the office, franchise, or corporate rights,
and in case of corporations, that the same shall be dissolved and the
court shall adjudge costs in favor of plaintiff."
As to costs, REm. REV. STAT. § 1046 reads: "When an information is filed
by the prosecuting attorney, he shall not be liable for the costs, but when
it is filed upon the relation of a private person such person shall be liable
for costs unless the same are adjudged against the defendant."
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divests the respondent of title to the office without more, the filing of the
appeal bond having no effect upon the finality of such judgment.80 The
harshness of this rule is illustrated in a decision wherein a public offi-
cer had been ousted from office by means of an information for al-
legedly committing a crime. Subsequently, the conviction of the crime
was reversed, but on petition for a new trial in the action of ouster, the
court held that under the existing statutory provisions, once judgment
of ouster was rendered, the respondent was divested entirely of his
title to the office, the court having no power to restore his rights
thereto.8 '
As to the effect of judgment obtained in an information filed against
either a municipal or private corporation, Sections 1034 (5), 1043, and
1044 of the statute are relevant. Section 1034 (5) allows the filing of
an information against a municipal or private corporation where it
has allegedly forfeited its rights or privileges for non-user or mis-user,
or where it has exercised powers not conferred by law.' In the event
such an information is filed, Section 1043 states that if judgment is
obtained against the corporation, "the same shall be dissolved."8 13 This
is supplemented by Section 1044, which provides that the corporation
shall be restrained from further corporate activity, and that a re-
ceiver shall be appointed to administer its property in order to effect a
distribution of its assets among its creditors.8 4
In only three cases, all involving private corporations, has the in-
formation been successfully prosecuted to final judgment of ouster.
Thus, in State ex rel. Conlan v. Cudin & Bergman Fire Clay Co.85 the
corporation's charter was forfeited for non-user, while in State ex rel.
Dunbar v. American University" the forfeiture was decreed because of
mis-user, and in State ex tel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corpora-
ation" the charter was held to be forfeited because the corporation was
engaging in activities in excess of its legal powers. In all three cases
the judgment was that the corporation be dissolved. There appears to
have been no case in Washington in which judgment of partial ouster
has been given. As has been noted, Section 1043 states that if judg-
ment of ouster is obtained, the corporation "shall be dissolved". Whether
the Supreme Court of Washington will hold that it can, under this sec-
tion, give judgment that only the particular activity complained of
8OFawcett v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 342, 46 Pac. 389 (1896); State'
ex rel. Mullen v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 376, 46 Pac. 402 (1896); State
ex rel. Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327, 60 P. (2d) 245 (1936).
nState ex -rel. Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327, 60 P. (2d) 245 (1936).
82See note 59, supra.
"See note 79, supra.
"'State ex rel. Amsterdamseh Trustees Kantoor v. Superior Court, 15
Wash. 668, 47 Pac. 31 (1896).
"48 Wash. 196, 93 Pac. 219 (1908).
"140 Wash. 625, 250 Pac. 52 (1926).
"105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
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should be suspended, rather than that the corporation itself should be
dissolved, is a matter for speculation. It should be noted, however, that
there is authority in other jurisdictions for judgment of partial ouster,
so that such a judgment would not be in the nature of an innovation
in such a suit.
8
The statute also provides that judgment of ouster may be enforced
by attachment and imprisonment where the respondent refuses to com-
ply therewith. 9
When the information is filed by a private person, he may recover
damages in an appropriate case, as well as receive judgment of ouster
against the respondent.8 0
In conclusion only passing mention is made of several of the statu-
tory sections which have not received the attention of the court in any
of its past decisions. Section 1045 provides for the filing of an infor-
mation by the proper authority in order to recover property escheated
to the state, while Sections 1047 and 1048 provide for proceedings to
annul patents, certificates or deeds in certain circumstances. The sec-
tions have evidently been put to little use, although codifying, at least
in the instance of the use of the information to recover escheated prop-
rty, a recognized form of procedure prevailing at common law.
ssState ex rel. Snyder v. Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153 Ind. 483,
53 N. E. 1089 (1899); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Combination Oil &
Gas Co., 105 Kan. 340, 182 Pac. 547 (1919); State ex rel. Attorney General
v. Old Town Bridge Corp., 85 Me. 17, 26 Atl. 947 (1892); Commonwealth
ex rel. Woodruff v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 290 Pa. 136,
138 Atl. 497 (1927); FERRIS, op. cit. supra, note 5, § 143; see Pound, Visita-
torial Jurisdiction Over Corporations in Equity (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 369.
S'REM. REV. STAT. § 1041.
ORElm. REV. STAT. § 1037 provides: ... and when filed by any other
person ... he may claim the damages he has sustained." REM. REV. STAT.
§ 1039 provides: "In every case wherein the right to an office is contested,
judgment shall be rendered . . . for the damages the relator may show
himself entitled to . . ." The only decisions involving § 1039 are State
ex rel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894) (damages
refused where relator failed to prove receipt of salary by successor to
office); Samuels v. Harrington, 43 Wash. 603, 86 Pac. 1071 (1906) (city held
not liable to de jure officer, on two grounds); State ex rel. Powell v.
Fassett, 69 Wash. 555, 125 Pac. 963 (1912) (judgment against successor but
not against city); State ex rel. Cole v. Coates, 74 Wash. 35, 132 Pac. 727
(1913) (damages against successor). But cf. Petley v. Tacoma, 127 Wash.
459, 221 Pac. 579 (1923); State ex rel. Allen v. Spokane, 150 Wash. 542,
273 Pac. 748, 277 Pac. 999 (1929); Fosnaugh v. Seattle, 167 Wash. 519, 9
P. (2d) 1110 (1932); State ex rel. Buchanan v. Seattle, 171 Wash. 113, 18
P. (2d) 3 (1933); Hill v. Tacoma, 175 Wash. 98, 26 P. (2d) 1030 (1933);
State ex rel. Jackson v. Seattle, 177 Wash. 646, 32 P. (2d) 1065 (1934); Haga
v. Seattle, 195 Wash. 226, 80 P. (2d) 821 (1938); civil service cases-not aris-
ing under § 1039-holding defendant employee not liable to discharged
employee but that municipality is liable. As the rule applied here is
stated-see State ex rel. Allen v. Spokane, supra at 550, 178 Pac. at 750-
in terms of civil service employees its effect on cases involving statutory
officers is problematical. See Samuels v. Harrington, supra.
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